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This study examines the possible challenges and prospects of the recent signing of the 
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement on South-South trade. The 
recent ratification of the agreement by the African Union (AU) Heads of Government 
and the establishment of the mega-regional trade agreements (MRTAs) by the major 
global trading economies are the biggest since the establishment of the WTO. One of 
these regional and continental agreements' principal objectives is to further strengthen 
trade terms and balance of trade statistics between member nations. Whereas almost all 
the regional and continental blocs have to a large extent, achieved the purpose of their 
trade agreements, Africa stands out as the only region whose intra-trade value still 
constitutes less than 15% of global trade share. Many reasons have been adduced to be 
responsible for the weak trade performance, one of which is weak regional integration. 
This study, therefore, concludes that for Africa to achieve significant improvement in 
global trade, the region needs to encourage regional trade, which will act as a catalyst 
for transforming the domestic economies and lay a robust foundation for healthy 
regional competition and integration.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The signing into law of a new trade agreement – the African continental free trade 
area (AfCTA), by the African Union (AU) Heads of governments on March 21, 2018, 
signifies a new trade beginning and enhanced efforts at actualizing the much desired 
regional integration for the African continent. In the past couple of years, concerted 
efforts have been made (including the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Abuja treaties of 
1980 and 1991, respectively) towards actualizing the developmental goal of regional 
integration. However, these efforts have not paid off, perhaps due to internal structural 
rigidities, which many experts say have been a source of great concern to the continent. 
Most African countries have been victims of poor governance structures and weak 
productive capacities. These have led to poor policy frameworks boosting aggregate 
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trade (domestic and foreign) and regional integration play important roles in global 
economic growth and development.  
The principles of international trade theory suggest that countries seeking to 
maximize their wealth and welfare should engage in trade devoid of barriers with other 
trading partners. In addition, countries derive the most benefits from liberalizing their 
own trade regimes. Taking together the principles of trade liberalization among trading 
partners and the individual trade regime liberalization is an appropriate mechanism for 
countries wishing to reap from the gains of free trade. However, despite the associated 
gains from trade liberalization and regional integration, many African countries are still 
under the burden of low trade yields compared with those of other regions such as Asia, 
Latin America, and the Caribbean (Mishra, 2018). A look at the world trade network 
between 2016 and 2017 shows that global trade and its associated benefits are 
concentrated among the East Asian, Europe and North American regions, with a greater 
share of the trade being intra-regional (see fig 1)  
Some of the factors identified by trade and development experts that lead to the 
abysmal trade performance in the African region include weak economic and 
industrial/trade policies, weak political and institutional structures, and fragile security 
architectures (see Chukwu, 2007; Mishra, 2018). Whereas some of these factors are 
debatable, which is incontrovertible is the issue of the quality of trade policies in place 
at both regional and continental levels. Over the years, the issue of trade policy among 
African trade experts has encouraged continental rather than regional trade, despite the 
challenges of unemployment, weak economic growth, poor infrastructure, and ill-
























Source: UNCTAD, 2018 
Figure 1. World trade network between 2016 and 2017 
Notes: The width and colors of lines, size of the nodes reflect the magnitude of trade in 2017, percentage 
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Although factor endowments in the African region are quite appreciable when 
compared with other regions of similar classification, trade and economic growth are 
constrained by deliberate domestic policies that encourage: (i) trade division rather than 
trade creation; (ii) rent-seeking and transfer of scarce resources to the development of 
sectors with low productivity; and (iii) the promotion of weak market structures rather 
than encourage competitive market environment. Whether the African region will 
reverse the trend of weak growth structure and weak competitive market environment 
depends on the successful implementation of the continental free trade area (CFTA) 
agreements and how the region is able to manage the recent buy-in of its major trading 
partners into one of the structural components of the MRTAs – the regional 
comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP). The objectives of this study are: (i) 
examine the possible effects of CFTA agreement in the context of Africa‟s regional 
integration efforts; and (ii) identify the underlying implications of the new trade 
arrangement on Africa-South-South trade in the context of the recent mega-regional 
trade agreements (MRTAs).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines Africa‟s trade 
performance and the macroeconomic environment. Section 3 reviews Africa‟s previous 
and present initiatives at promoting regional and continental integration. Section 4 looks 
at current trends in South-South merchandise trade and the potential impact on the 
AfCFTA. Section 5 examines the implications of the membership of Africa‟s major 
trading partners in the RCEP - a component of the mega-regional trade agreements 
(MRTAs) while section 6 concludes the study. 
 
AFRICA’S TRADE PERFORMANCE AND MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Africa’s trade performance 
A cursory observation of Africa‟s trade performance in the past decade shows that 
the region‟s share of global trade is weak compared with other regions such as Asia, 
Latin America, and Oceania. However, in recent times, available statistics show that 
Africa has been experiencing significant improvement in trade value to the rest of the 
world. According to recent trade statistics, Africa‟s share of trade to the rest of the 
world increased in value from US$226 from 1983 to 2014 by 42% to US$760 billion in 
current prices in the period 2015–2017 (see UNCTAD, 2019). The significant 
improvement in the value of trade is as a result of the transition from the export of 
agricultural commodities to export of mining and manufacturing products by the five 
main commodity exporters (The five main commodity exporters in the region include: South 
Africa, Nigeria, Morocco, Algeria, and Angola). A look at Africa‟s recent merchandise 
exports shows that the region‟s annual export growth rate stands at 14.7%, with a lower 
import of 11.6%. Although these growth rates are very encouraging compared with 
other developing regions, the share of trade as a percentage of world output is extremely 
low with 3% (see Table 1). A look at the intra-trade structure for Africa, shows that 
intra merchandise exports are also low compared with other regions. A study by 
Parshotam (2018) revealed that Africa‟s total intra-trade basket averaged 12-14% due to 
the region‟s continuous reliance on the production of raw materials and the levels of 
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Table 1. Leading exporters and importers by a group of developing economies, 2018 



















South Africa 94 0.48 5.6 (e) 114 (e) 0.57 (e) 12.1 
Nigeria 61 0.31 36.2 72 0.36 16.8 
Algeria 41 0.21 17.0 51 0.26 14.7 
Angola 41 0.21 17.8 46 0.23 0.3 
Morocco 29 0.15 13.2 43 0.22 37.5 
Developing Africa 484 2.49 14.7 576 2.91 11.6 
Mexico 451 2.32 10.1 477 2.41 10.3 
Brazil 240 1.23 10.2 189 0.95 19.7 
Chile 75 0.39 9.6 75 0.38 14.9 
Argentina 62 0.32 5.1 65 0.33 -2.2 
Peru 49 0.25 8.0 51 0.26 11.2 
Developing America 1086 5.58 9.2 1123 5.67 10.6 
China 2487 12.78 9.9 2136 10.79 15.8 
Korea Republic 605 3.11 5.4 627 3.17 6.4 
China, Hong Kong SAR 568 2.92 3.4 535 2.70 11.9 
Singapore 413 2.12 10.6 514 2.60 14.3 
China, Taiwan province 336 1.73 5.9 371 1.87 13.1 
Developing Asia and 
Oceania 
7087 36.43 9.8 6623 33.46 11.0 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook, 2019. *(e) estimate 
Notes: A 10-year spread of global merchandise trade exports (by regions and some regional  trading 
blocs) are shown in appendices 3 and 4, respectively 
According to the study, “approximately 26% of African countries rely on one or 
two resource commodities for at least 75% of their exports, while 60% rely on a 
maximum of five commodities” (p.5). However, a United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD, 2019) report shows that between 2015 and 2017, intra-
African exports, as a percentage of world exports, stood at 17%. It is compared to 68% 
recorded for Europe, 59% for Asia, 55% for America and 7% for Oceania in the same 
period. Similarly, a look at intra-regional economic community (intra-REC) trade in 
Africa shows that while there‟s a deeper level of regional integration, the intra-regional 
trade area (intra-RTA) average trade share of the region‟s main economic blocs is lower 
when compared with the other major RTAs (see WTO, 2018 and UNCTAD, 2019).  
For instance, while average Africa‟s intra RTA trade in 2016 was 11.2%, the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and European Union (EU) were 24, 50, and 64%, respectively. 
An analysis of the intra-regional trade performance of the economic blocs, 2018, shows 
that among the eight regional blocs, preferential access is topmost for East African 
Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA) as they enjoy lower tariff structure on the export of 
agriculture and industrial commodities. However, among the eight regional blocs, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) are the least as they do not have preferential access to many African Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs). Recent trade statistics (UNCTAD, 2019) show that 
while exporters from the EAC bloc enjoy greater preferential access to African markets, 
a lower tariffs structure is about 8.9 percentage points lower than the tariffs faced by 
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(7.8), COMESA (6.8), and IGAD (6.7). Exporters from EAC pay average tariffs as high 
as 2.5 percent in AMU and ECOWAS markets (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Trade preference matrix, 2016 (percent) 
Importer 
Exporter 
EU Africa AMU CEN-SAD COMESA EAC ECCAS ECOWAS IGAD SADC 
Africa 2.9 6.2 -0.5 3.8 6.8 8.9 3.7 4.9 6.7 7.8 
AMU 4.2 5.0 7.7 7.2 5.0 -2.0 -0.5 -0.1 1.1 -2.6 
CEN-SAD 4.7 3.7 0.6 5.6 1.7 4.5 0.9 8.2 -1.8 0.3 
COMESA -1.8 7.4 4.2 5.7 8.6 10.0 5.6 -4.1 8.9 7.7 
EAC -0.5 7.7 -2.3 8.7 11.1 12.8 7.4 -5.2 12.0 5.9 
ECCAS 1.3 4.9 -3.2 4.8 10.9 13.8 5.2 -1.4 13.4 2.2 
ECOWAS -0.3 2.9 -2.3 4.9 -2.7 -3.0 -1.9 7.6 -3.3 -1.2 
IGAD 5.8 5.4 -2.8 9.8 11.9 12.7 9.4 -5.0 11.7 2.6 
SADC 3.5 6.0 -5.0 -1.7 4.9 4.7 3.6 -2.9 1.8 7.7 
Source: UNCTAD (2019) 
Notes: Positive figures in the table indicate high preferential access in the African market due to a lower tariff 
structure. 
Intra-regional trade preferential access is higher between EAC and ECCAS and 
between EAC and IGAD. However, AMU and ECOWAS are regional blocs that do not 
prefer many other African RECs. The high performance of these regional blocs, 
especially those of EAC and SADC, might be attributed to the improvement in the 
mining and manufacturing sectors. The high performance of these regional blocs, 
especially those of EAC and SADC, might be attributed to the improvement in the 
mining and manufacturing sectors.  
An assessment of Africa‟s trade similarity and complementary index also presents 
the key products market indicators (see Table 3). Whereas there is a significant increase 
in developing countries‟ similarity index from 0.72 in 1995 to 0.81 in 2013, Africa‟s 
performance index fell below Latin America, European Union (EU), and  South Asian 
averages.  
Table 3. Trade complementarity and similarity indexes, 1995-2013 
 
             Complementarity                      Similarity 
Indicator/year 1995 2000 2010 2012 2013 1995 2000 2010 2012 2013 
Developing economies 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.81 
Developed economies 0.87 0.86 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.81 
Africa 0.42 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.47 
Eastern Africa 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.34 
Middle Africa 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Northern Africa 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.29 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.39 
Southern Africa 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.42 
Western Africa 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.31 
SSA 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.43 0.43 
South America 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.50 
Eastern Asia 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 
EU28 0.83 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.84 0.83 0.78 0.77 0.78 
*Source: Verter (2017). 
Notes: Trade similarity and complementary index range from 0-1 percent. Any of the values above 0.5 percent 
signifies a high index 
Similarly, Africa‟s trade complementarity index (TCI) also presents a similar 
weakness compared to other regions. The poor performance of Africa, judging from 
these two indexes, demonstrates a lack of depth in the region‟s markets and a glaring 
weakness in intraregional cooperation. However, within the region's assessment, 
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indicating that the region is making more frantic efforts in matching their export 
compositions with the import structures of other member communities.  
Africa’s macroeconomic constraints and global shocks 
According to UNCTAD (2018), one of the major growing concerns for most 
developing countries is the issue of the ongoing trade tension between the United States 
of America and China. Going by the current tension in global trade, the further 
confrontation between these two superpowers will further create more negative shocks 
to the commodities and financial markets, thus leading to another round of global 
economic crisis. As stated by the UNCTAD report, “trade frictions weigh on global 
growth as they impose adjustment costs on international firms which would reflect upon 
investment decisions, profitability, and productivity. In addition, the increase in 
uncertainty about commitments to trade rules adds to the risk of investing abroad” (p.2). 
These will certainly create more negative economic consequences on fragile economies, 
especially low-income countries that are more susceptible to unfavorable global shocks.  
Apart from the apparent negative shocks to low-income countries and Africa in 
particular, another growing macroeconomic concern is the issue of nominal exchange 
rates depreciation/appreciation and stagflation. According to development economics 
literature, the nominal exchange rate is the benchmark for determining global 
competitiveness. While some other factors might also affect the level of market 
competitiveness, the current trade „war‟ has been the major factor that contributes to the 
depreciation of the Chinese‟s Renminbi, and at the same time, contributing to the 
appreciation of the United States‟ Dollar (UNCTAD, 2018). Growth studies posit a 
strong correlation between different currency markets (see Fedorova and Saleem, 2009; 
Lee, 2009; Ke, Wang, and Murray, 2010). An adjustment in one dominant currency 
automatically affects the others, thus leading to high currency volatility in the currency 
markets of many economies.  
According to UNCTAD (2018), “the trade confrontations between the United 
States and China have already weighed on currency markets by increasing the volatility 
and downward pressure for many currencies, especially in the riskier emerging 
markets.” A cursory analysis of the African financial, commodity, and currency markets 
shows that the trade tension's impact is huge on the region. Over 80% of African 
economies are major trading partners with the Asian „Tigers‟ and the United States of 
America. However, the trade war between China and the United States of America has 
caused most economies in Africa to face acute foreign exchange shortages in their 
currency markets. Although Africa‟s share of global trade is very insignificant (about 
3%), the escalation of the trade tension will have a second and third-tier effect on the 
region‟s trade and aggregate growth structure.  
Currently, Africa‟s global trade is structured asymmetrically, with exports of 
primary commodities on one hand and imports of capital goods on the other. According 
to Prempeh (2006) and Barratt Brown (2007), Africa is characterized by unfair trade 
relations with trading partners with fewer exports and more imports. Presently, over 
75% of Africa‟s exports are on primary commodities, even when studies have shown 
that primary commodities are characterized by low productivity, low wages, and high 
price volatility (see Gupta, 1993). With high commodity volatility and huge import 
dependence, Africa‟s revenue profile and growth architecture are tailored towards the 
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environment is the issue of stagflation which many economic and trade experts say 
affects trade output negatively.  
One factor that has been identified as leading to stagflation in theoretical and 
empirical constructs is the structure of tariff a country imposes on its trade components. 
Empirical studies show that a high tariff regime discourages domestic and foreign trade, 
increases inflationary pressure, and reduces trade earnings and labor productivity 
(Madsen, 2001; Kim and Beladi, 2005; and Opp, 2010). According to UNCTAD key 
statistics report (2018:2), “tariffs can contribute to stagnation as they can reduce 
efficiency due to the frictions they create while increasing inflationary pressure because 
some of their costs will be inevitably passed down to consumers…while moderately 
higher inflation is generally not a problem if it is as a result of economic growth, the 
periods of stagflation often results in job losses and rising unemployment”. A look at 
Africa‟s current inflationary and unemployment trends present some worrisome 
dimension as the entire region has continued to experience rising unemployment and 
inflation rates.   
Apart from the CFA franc countries that enjoy lower inflation rates of about 2%, 
perhaps as a result of their currency is tied to the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
some regions, such as the East Africa Countries and some oil-exporting countries, 
experienced higher inflation rates averaging above 10%. A look at Africa‟s average 
inflation rates shows that it spiked from 6.7% in 2013 to 7.4% in 2015 and to 12.5% in 
2017 before dropping to 9.2% in 2019 (IMF, 2020). Similarly, unemployment rate 
seems to follow the same trend with inflation. Although the trend of unemployment was 
slower as compared to inflation, average unemployment rate in the last 5 years was 
consistently on a rising trend. A look at the average unemployment rate in the Sub-
Saharan region in the period 2014 -2019 shows that the rate increased by over 7% 
(World Bank, 2020).  
The rising trend in unemployment (especially youth unemployment) is worrisome 
given the region‟s high population and low economic growth. Recent African Economic 
Outlook report (AEO, 2020) stated that given an estimated 226 million youth 
unemployment in 2015, the figure is projected to increase by over 42%, to 321 million 
by 2030. Many studies have expressed concern about the inherent danger of rising 
inflation and unemployment in the mix of weak output growth. According to Ademola 
and Badiru (2016) and Mohseni and Jouzaryan (2016), rising inflation and 
unemployment rates decrease economic growth in the long run. Accessing the effect of 
inflation and unemployment on the economy, Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer (1980); 
Ghosh and Ghosh (2013); and Rogers (2013) showed that there‟s a great difficulty in 
tackling economic stagnation in the period of rising inflation and unemployment 
regimes. An analysis of the African economic and trade indicators shows that the region 
is burdened by low output growth, high commodity prices, and high tariff regimes (see 
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Table 4. Growth of world output 2016–2020 
 








World 2.5 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 0.1 0.0 
Developed economies 1.7 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.9 0.2 0.2 
Economies in transition 0.4 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.6 -0.2 -0.4 
Africa 1.6 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.7 -0.3 -0.3 
      North Africa 2.9 5.3 3.7 3.4 3.5 -0.4 -0.7 
      East Africa 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.5 0.4 0.2 
     Central Africa -0.5 -0.2 2.2 2.5 3.8 0.1 0.0 
     West Africa 0.2 2.4 3.2 3.4 3.8 -0.1 0.0 
      Southern Africa 0.3 1.5 1.2 2.1 2.6 -1.1 -0.4 
East and South Asia 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.6 0.0 -0.4 
       East Asia 5.7 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.5 0.1 0.0 
       China 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.3 6.2 0.1 0.0 
       South Asia 8.0 6.1 5.6 5.4 5.9 -0.9 -1.6 
India
b
 7.1 6.7 7.4 7.6 7.4 0.2 0.2 
Western Asia 3.1 2.5 3.0 2.4 3.4 0.7 -0.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean -1.3 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.3 -1.0 -0.8 
       South America -2.9 0.5 0.4 1.4 2.3 -1.4 -1.0 
       Brazil -3.5 1.0 1.4 2.1 2.5 -0.6 -0.4 
      Mexico and Central America 3.1 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.3 -0.2 -0.1 
      Caribbean -0.7 -0.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 0.1 0.0 
Least developed countries 3.6 4.6 5.0 5.0 5.7 -0.4 -0.5 
Memorandum items        
World trade 2.5 5.3 3.8 3.7 3.9 0.3 0.1 
World output growth with PPP weights
d
 3.2 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.7 0.0 -0.1 
Source: World Economic Situation Prospect (WESP, 2019). (a) Forecast, based in part on Project LINK; (b) Fiscal 
year basis; (c) Includes goods and services; and (d) Based on 2012 benchmark. 
The study by Madsen (2001) finds that global output contracted by 14% due to the 
increase in world tariff. A look at the regional tariff structure in 2017 shows that among 
all the regions classified as developing economies, Africa‟s intraregional tariffs on 
exports are relatively the highest, except in South Asia (see Table 5). However, while 
intraregional tariff is high in Africa, the extra-regional tariff is lower, indicating that the 
degree of trade restrictiveness is higher in the region. While other regions such as the 
Transition and Latin American countries operate lower tariff regimes, Africa is 
burdened with a high tariff structure that has negatively affected trade values. Although 
the increase in tariff by most African countries is driven by the quest for an increase in 
revenue and protection of infant industries, the overall objective is not achieved due to 
trade restrictions (tax escalation) imposed by Africa‟s main trading partners (Verter, 
2017). 



















Developed Countries 1.6 2.6 1.2 2.1 0.4 1.7 0.6  
-0.5 0.2 0.3 -0.8 -0.1 0.8 0.0 
 
 
East Asia 4.9 2.7 5.4 3.2 1.7 3.8 1.8  
-1.0 -0.7 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 1.2 -0.3 
 
 
Latin America 3.8 8.0 1.1 10.9 1.9 2.0 2.9  
-0.3 -1.0 -0.6 -1.5 -0.7 0.4 -0.5 
 
 
South Asia 10.7 10.4 17.8 6.8 5.7 8.1 9.2  
0.6 -0.3 -2.0 -1.1 -1.1 0.8 -1.7 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.4 11.6 9.0 8.3 3.1 8.6 5.4  
-0.7 -0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.8 2.1 0.0 
 
 
Transition Economies 3.4 1.9 2.0 4.0 0.6 0.4 4.7  
-2.9 -5.7 -8.4 -6.1 -2.2 0.3 -2.6 
 
 
West Asia & North 
Africa 
3.2 5.5 6.4 4.0 2.6 8.7 1.9 
 
-0.9 -0.4 -0.8 0.3 0.0 4.7 -0.1 
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Granted, there has been a gradual reduction in tariffs and other market access 
instruments since after the 2001 Doha Round Submit, by almost all African countries, 
high trade tariffs persist along the value chains of most processed commodities of the 
regional blocs. Another possible constraint that has been identified that impedes the 
growth of trade and Africa‟s macroeconomic environment is the issue of sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS). The underlining principles of SPS suggest that exporting nations 
should adhere strictly to safety standards as stipulated by importing nations. Over the 
years, many LDCs (including Africa) have had their products rejected by importing 
countries at different ports of entry due to failure to meet set standards. For instance, in 
2015, the European Union (EU) banned all processed goods from Nigeria for one year 
for failing to meet set standards (Verter, 2017).  
Many African countries lack the requisite knowledge, expertise, and tools for 
setting standards and enforcing compliance. Although many African countries are 
seriously trying to improve these gaps through development in socio-economic 
structures, the overall outcome is yet to stimulate trade and aggregate demand for 
commodities. Lastly, the issue of domestic support and export subsidies on products by 
Africa‟s major trading partners is another great concern to Africa‟s macroeconomic 
environment and trade growth. Received literature shows that most of Africa‟s trading 
partners still provide domestic support and export subsidies to most of their farmers, 
infant, and as well as developed industries (see Lee, Hoffman and Cramer, 2003 and 
Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney, 2004). Domestic supports to farmers and small and 
medium scale enterprises (SMEs), provides advanced technologies and large economies 
of scale to would-be producers.  
Verter (2017) observed that under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
around 58 billion euros or 40% of the European Union‟s total budget were earmarked 
for CAP in 2014. This huge amount of resources earmarked for the protection and 
support of infant industries puts these industries far ahead of their African counterparts, 
whose economies cannot boost of such funds. The lack of intervention funds makes 
African products more expensive and less competitive. In China, the country operates a 
trade policy framework where governments provide export incentives to producers 
wishing to export their products to any part of the world. Unlike in Africa, where there 
are few export incentives to producers, the shipping cost of freights in China is directly 
borne by the government, thus reducing production costs. The lack of domestic supports 
for African producers and farmers creates huge trade gaps for the region. 
 
SOME OF AFRICA’S PREVIOUS INITIATIVES AT ENHANCING REGIONAL 
AND CONTINENTAL TRADE 
Received studies showed that over the years, the AU had established many 
initiatives to foster regional integration and enhance competitiveness in global trade. 
Some of these initiatives as highlighted in Mishra (2018) include: the establishment of 
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD); (ii) the African Free Trade 
zone (AFTZ); (iii) the Minimum Integration Programme; (iv) Boosting Intra-African 
Trade; and (v) the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) agreement. These initiatives are 
briefly discussed below. 
1. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD): This initiative was 
established by the AU in 2002, with the sole aim of integrating a holistic socio-
economic development strategy among member nations. It also aimed to halt the 
overreliance of most African economies on foreign aid and replace it with an 
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2.  The African Free Trade Zone (AFTZ): The establishment of the African Free Trade 
zone (AFTZ) was heralded by the AU as a new trade arrangement in fostering 
„regionalism‟ among the African countries. The foremost AFTZ, was announced at 
the EAC-SADC-COMESA Summit in October 2000. However, in 2012, other 
regional blocs such as the ECOWAS, ECCAS, and AMU, were integrated into the 
already established structure to operationalize the AFTZ agenda of the AU fully. The 
full commencement of operation of the AFTZ in 2018 marked the beginning of 
Africa‟s journey towards regional and continental integration. 
3. Minimum Integration Programme (MIP): In 2009, a mechanism for convergence 
known as MIP was signed into law by a special committee of the AU and the RECs. 
The purpose was to see to the identification of projects both at regional and 
continental levels and see to their quick implementation. While the job of the RECs 
was expected to work at a wavering pace on all the activities of MIP, the RECs are 
also required by their briefs to identify priority projects/programs and see to their full 
implementation. 
4. Boosting Intra-African Trade (BITA): In 2012, the African Union (AU) Heads of 
state and government organized a summit on the theme: “Boosting Intra-African 
Trade”. The essence of the summit was to provide a framework for the deepening of 
Africa‟s domestic markets to significantly increase intra-African trade volume from 
an average of 12 to 25 percent. In order to achieve this objective, seven priority 
clusters were set up, and they include: trade policy, trade facilitation, productive 
capacity, trade-related infrastructure, trade finance, trade information, and factor 
market integration. 
5. Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA): Africa‟s journey towards attaining regional and 
continental integration was achieved at Egypt's COMESA-EAC-SADC meeting of 
2015. At the meeting, a resolution was reached by the Heads of Governments of 
these economic blocs to launch a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) to take care of 
the interest of the over 600 million customers of the region. According to Mishra 
(2018), the launch of TFTA “demonstrated the possibility of a collective action 
among several heterogeneous nations and showcased the feasibility of harmonizing 
three different preferential trade regimes into one unified scheme” (p.12).  
The AfCFTA agreement and the underlying benefits to Africa 
The signing into law of the AfCFTA agreement by the AU Heads of government 
heralds a new beginning. It provides a vaster of opportunities for growth and 
development for the continent. The CFTA agreement is aimed at achieving the 
following main objectives: (i) create a single continental market for goods and services, 
with free movement of business persons and investments, and thus pave the way for 
accelerating the establishment of the Continental Customs Union and the African 
customs union; (ii) expand intra-African trade through better harmonization and 
coordination of trade liberalization and facilitation regimes and instruments across 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and across Africa in general; (iii) resolve the 
challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and 
continental integration processes; and (iv) enhance competitiveness at the industry and 
enterprise levels through exploiting opportunities for scale production, continental 
market access and better reallocation of resources (AU, 2019).  
Given that the CFTA agreement is yet to be fully operational, many studies have 
projected that the agreement's impact on Africa‟s trade growth is huge. Going by the 
projections of the AU, the CFTA is expected to, among other things, increase online 
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decrease Africa‟s trade with the rest of the world by 51% if all forms of tariffs are 
eliminated. The study by McKinsey Global Institute (2016), estimates that with the 
establishment of the CFTA, Africa‟s share of manufactured output is projected to 
increase by over 86% from $500 billion in 2016 to $930 billion in 2025. Although 
Africa‟s exports are projected to decline significantly with other regions, „intraregional 
trade is expected to lead to the much-desired industrialization of the continent‟ (p.19).  
The study by Shingal and Mendez-Parra (2020) projected that when the AfCFTA 
is fully implemented, the stock of intra-African Greenfield investment will increase by 
14%. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2018) report 
highlights possible areas of benefit to the African region once the CFTA agreement is 
fully implemented. The report posits that the CFTA will improve trade-related 
infrastructure, reduce import duties and transit costs, and lead to a more than 50% 
increase in intra-African exports by 2022, from the 2010 levels. The UNECA study 
further stated that, apart from structural transformation and increased labor productivity 
in industrial and services sectors, trade statistics are expected to double up on the 
removal of non-tariff barriers by as much as US$ 40.6 billion (or 39.9%).  
Similarly, UNCTAD's (2019) report on Africa shows that the region stands to 
benefit immensely from the CFTA agreement when it is fully implemented. Some areas 
of possible benefits as highlighted in the UNCTAD report include: (i)increased 
competitiveness of firms and boosting of intra-African trade and investment; (ii) 
improved business and investment climate that attracts foreign direct investment and 
fosters linkages between foreign and local firms; (iii) economic growth and structural 
transformation; (iv) participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in regional and 
global value chains; (v) development of agriculture and agribusiness and implications 
for rural development; (vi) unleashed the potential of the services sector; and informal 
cross-border trade, gender implications, and reduced illicit trade.  
The study by Parshotam (2018) posits that the establishment of the AfCFTA will 
stimulate total African exports by 4 percent ($25.3 billion) and result in an overall 52% 
($34.6 billion) increase in intra-African trade when compared to the baseline figure (no 
trade reforms in 2022). Furthermore, the study stated that with sectoral expansions in 
agriculture and agro-processing, industry, and services, overall trade is expected to 
increase by 53% between 2010 and 2022. The report further stressed that the full 
implementation of the CFTA agreement would improve the region‟s cross-border 
movements in investments, goods, and services and increase interconnectivity. Apart 
from these projected increases in volumes and values of trade due to the implementation 
of the CFTA agreement, there will also be static and dynamic gains to member nations.  
While static gains lead to increases in economic welfare in the short-run, dynamic 
gains which arise from competitive pressures from member nations lead to productivity 
benefits in the long run. Other associated benefits of the full implementation of the 
AfCFTA agreement include: (i) improved business and investment environment that 
attracts foreign direct investment (FDI) and fosters linkages between foreign and 
domestic firms; (ii) participation of small and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) in 
regional and global value chains; and (iii) improvement in aggregate growth and 
structural transformation (see UNCTAD, 2019). However, some quarters have caveats 
on the signing into law of the AfCFTA agreement (see Kohnert, 2018 and Signe and 
Van der Ven, 2019). These studies argue that the ACFTA agreement might not solve 
the intra-trade challenges in the region until all aspects of the Phase (1 and 2) 
agreements are fully negotiated. Going by this observation, it is very clear that the 
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countries and the commitment and willingness of all participating countries to fully 
implement the stages of the agreement. In summary, it is very evident that the 
rectification of the CFTA agreement will boost intraregional integration and boost 
industrial growth, inter-sectoral linkages and facilitate infrastructural development that 
would eventually lead to improvement in intra-trade relations among member nations. 
The AU Continental Integration Agenda 
The signing into law of the CFTA agreement follows the establishment of the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), a free trade area between COMESA, SADC, and 
the EAC. Establishing these RECs aims “to bridge regional divisions by building on the 
TFTA‟s regional industrial development policies, strengthening trade among the various 
RECs and incorporating all African economic blocs under standardized rules and 
regulations” (Parshotam, 2018:7). Of the 18 preferential trade agreements establishing 
the various African RECs, eight are recognized by the AU as „building blocks‟ for the 
African Economic Community (AEC). The eight AECs include: Community of Sahel-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). See Fig.2 for a web of intra-
African trade agreements, including the eight RECs, and four sub-regional groupings. 
In order to achieve the objective of integrating all the economic blocs, the AU 
established a six-phased timeline covering a 34-year period (see Table 6) and set up five 
key regional integration indicators to measure the performance of these economic blocs. 
Table 6. The AU continental integration agenda 
Phase Timeline Action Plan 
PHASE 1    5 years Strengthen existing RECs and create new RECs in regions where 
they do not exist. 
PHASE 2    8 years Ensure consolidation within each REC, focusing on liberalizing 
tariffs, removing non-tariff barriers, etc. 
PHASE 3    10 years Establish in each REC and FTA and customs union (with a common 
external tariff and single territory) 
PHASE 4    2 years Coordinate and harmonize tariff and non-tariff systems of RECs to 
establish a continental customs union 
PHASE 5    4 years Establish an African common market 
PHASE 6 5 years Establish the AEC, including an African Monetary Union and a 
Pan-African Parliament 
Source: SAIIA (2018) 
The 2016 African regional integration index is shown in Table 7. In the trade 
integration index, the statistics show a high movement of trade in almost all the RECs, 
except CEN-SAD and ECOWAS. According to trade theories, when trade moves freely 
and at faster rates, the cost of doing business becomes cheaper, thus benefiting both 
producers and consumers. In the case of regional infrastructure, statistics show that 
other blocs are still lagging behind apart from EAC and IGAD that performed creditably 
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CEN-SAD 0.35 0.25 0.24 0.48 0.52 
COMESA 0.57 0.44 0.45 0.27 0.34 
EAC 0.78 0.50 0.55 0.72 0.16 
ECCAS 0.53 0.45 029 0.40 0.60 
ECOWAS 0.44 0.43 0.26 0.80 0.61 
IGAD 0.51 0.63 0.43 0.45 0.22 
SADEC 0.51 0.50 0.35 0.53 0.40 
UMA 0.63 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.20 
Average of Eight RECs 0.54 0.46 0.38 0.52 0.38 
Source: Africa Regional Integration Index Report, (2016) 
Evidence has shown that countries with quality road networks, communication, 
and airports tend to have low business costs. ECOWAS, ECCAS, and CEN-SAD scored 
highest in the financial and macroeconomic dimensions. This result indicates the free 
flow of capital, the lower transaction cost of doing business, and the higher efficiency of 
the financial institutions within these three RECs. In the case of the free movement of 
people dimension, statistics show that ECOWAS and EAC are the only blocs with freer 
cross-border movement, while COMESA is the least. Although the overall performance 
of ECA and SADEC blocs are relatively better than other blocs in all dimensions, the 
index for ease of doing business (financial and macroeconomic integration) for these 
two blocs is weak. 
 
SOUTH-SOUTH MERCHANDISE EXPORT TRADE AND POTENTIAL 
IMPACT ON AFCFTA 
Since 1990, a number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have been signed 
by South-South countries to boost trade, economic growth, and interregional 
integration. Between the initial times of signing the agreements to date, more than 267 
PTAs have been signed by participating regions, of which Africa is one. A look at the 
impact of these agreements on South-South trade statistics  shows that these PTAs have 
greatly improved trade between member regions due to strict adherence and 
implementation of the various trade agreements (Notes: See appendices 5(i), 5(ii), and 
5(iii) for annual intra-trade and extra-trade of economies, regional trading blocs, and country 
groups by-product ). Although some of the participating regions have benefited more than 
the others from the signing of the PTAs, perhaps as a result of further improvement in 
market access, technology, and infrastructure, the overall economic synergy between 
these regions can be gauged from the recent robust trade outcomes.  
For instance, in the last decade, Africa‟s merchandise export to Asia and Oceania 
increased from US$ 113billion to US$161billion in 2018. Similarly, export from these 
regions to Africa also improved significantly by over 54%, from US$162billion to 
US$249billion within the same period. However, the case of Africa and Latin America 
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Source: Adopted from Economic Integration in Africa (www.afdb.org) 
Figure 2. Regional Trade Arrangements (RTAs) in Africa, 2019       
Although the percentage reduction in trade between the two regions stands at 0.5 
and 15%, respectively, the trade value from Latin America to Africa is higher within the 
same period (see Table 8). The improvement in trade between Africa and Asia, most 
especially, is principally due to the robust trade relationship between Africa, China, and 
India. A look at the Africa-China-India relationship shows that trade inflows and 
outflows have almost doubled in the space of 5years. Available statistics from 
UNCTAD report (2019) shows that the value of Africa‟s export to China and India in 
2018 stands at US$54 billion and US$37 billion, respectively. An analysis of regional 
trade specialization pattern shows that while about three-quarters of Africa‟s exports are 
mainly on primary commodities (ores, metals, precious stones, and non-monetary gold, 
food items, and fuels), Asia and Latin America/Oceania export commodities are mainly 
on manufactures. 
Available statistics show that in 2018, over 42% of Africa‟s exports to its main 
trading partners were in the commercial services (fuels). Conversely, a close look at 
Africa‟s import structure shows that manufacturing imports from its trading partners are 
three times higher than manufacturing exports. Although a significant trade imbalance 
exists between Africa and its trading partners, this is counterbalanced by Africa‟s 
primary exports in precious metals, non-monetary gold, and fuels (Notes: see appendix 
2(i), 2(ii) and 2(iii) for export by product group, origin and destination (2018).). Available 
statistics in 2018 show that while total manufacture export from Asia and Oceania to 
Africa stood at US$183,012 million, that of Africa was US$16,809 million.  
However, a look at Africa‟s primary exports to Asia and Oceania shows a trend 
reversal. Whereas the value of Africa‟s export of these commodities to the two regions 
stood at US$43,690million, export from the region to Africa was US$5,526million (see 
appendix 2(iii)). Conversely, as trade relations between Africa, Asia and Oceania 
continue to improve, trade value between Africa and Latin America declines, though in 
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Africa and its South-South trading partners once the AfCFTA agreements are fully 
implemented. 











World 2008 16135 5517 481 866 4 169 564 9959 
 
2013 18997 8025 640 1126 6260 595 10121 
 
2018 19414 8064 591 1076 6397 474 10729 
Developing economies 
 
2008 6274 3184 236 373 2575 123 2941 
 
2013 8454 4952 359 485 4109 159 3285 
 




2008 550 186 55 18 113 3 357 
 
2013 587 274 86 21 166 3 300 
 
2018 487 250 77 12 161 3 227 
Developing economies: 
America 2008 910 322 19 199 104 10 569 
 
2013 1117 463 20 219 224 10 634 
 
2018 1084 415 16 173 226 8 631 
Developing economies: 
Asia and Oceania 
 
2008 4814 2675 162 156 2358 111 2015 
 
2013 6750 4216 253 244 3719 146 2351 
 
2018 7077 4316 249 249 3818 133 2622 
Transition economies 
 
2008 721 138 12 11 115 144 438 
 
2013 810 187 14 10 163 137 419 
 
2018 682 207 23 10 174 112 360 
Developed economies 
 
2008 9140 2194 233 482 1479 296 6579 
 
2013 9732 2886 267 630 1988 300 6417 
 
2018 10083 2876 226 632 2018 219 6888 
Source: UNCTAD handbook of statistics (2019). 
  
 
AFCFTA AND THE MRTAS – THE UNDERLYING IMPLICATIONS TO 
AFRICA’S TRADE 
The two main selling points of the AfCFTA agreements are the drive to boost 
Africa‟s intra-regional trade by over 52% and decrease trade deficits by 51% when all 
forms of tariffs are eliminated and the expedition of the continental integration 
processes. However, the latest developments within the global trade circle, especially 
the signing into effect of one of the structural components of the MRTAs - the regional 
comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP), by most of Africa‟s trading partners, 
suggest that achieving these laudable objectives might be grossly affected. The three 
structural components of the MRTAs include: Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP). 
A study by Mevel and Mathieu (2016) argues that unless the AfCFTA agreement 
is properly deepened, Africa‟s total trade may be adversely affected through trade 
diversion by some of its trading partners once the RCEP fully comes on stream. This is 
because since Africa is not part of the mega-trade agreements, its major trading partners 
from Asia and Latin America might wish to seek a deeper form of continental trade 
understanding with other markets with the sole purpose of maintaining or increasing 
their global trade share. For instance, if the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
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of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is projected to decrease by 
over US$11 billion (Mevel and Mathieu, 2016). 
However, the study also shows that the decrease in the value of export trade to 
RCEP countries might lead to an appreciable increase of exports to countries outside 
RCEP by over US$8 billion. A similar report from a joint study conducted by UNECA 
and Confederation of Indian Industries (2018), also estimates that Africa‟s exports to 
other countries outside RCEP will increase by US$27.5 billion by 2022 if the AfCFTA 
is established parallel to other MRTAs. Although African countries stand to gain 
significantly from trade shift from continental to regional, the quality of commodity 
trade might be low and less competitive, going by the current level of industrialization, 
markets, and other structural challenges that include: weak output growth structure that 
is highly susceptible to global shocks, low productive capacities, poor security 
architecture, and low-quality infrastructure.  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Conclusion 
This study examines the Africa‟s continental free trade area agreement and South-
South trade in the context of the mega-regional trade agreements (MRTAs). One of the 
principal reasons why the AfCFTA agreement was established is to attain a single 
common integrated market for Africa in order to assist in improving intra-trade among 
member countries. Hitherto, Africa‟s share of intraregional trade, as a percentage of 
world trade, remains the lowest when compared with other South-South economies 
despite the region‟s huge resource endowments. Therefore, the establishment and 
signing into law of the new Africa‟s trade agreement is seen in many quarters as a 
credible measure to correct the trade imbalance in the region, reinvigorate the domestic 
market, and lay a sound foundation for the much-desired regional integration. However, 
many trade experts have strongly argued that the success of this new trade agreement by 
the African continent may be short-lived given the current structural and economic 
challenges facing the  continent, the ongoing United States - China trade „war‟ and the 
recent entry of Africa‟s major trading partners of the ASEAN countries into the mega-
regional trade agreements (MRTAs). Experts say the membership of Africa‟s major 
trade partners into one of the structural components of the MRTAs- the regional 
comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP), will lead to substantial trade losses to the 
region. 
Recommendation 
This study, therefore, recommends that for the African continent to mitigate these 
losses and improve its share of global trade, the region needs to make concerted efforts 
to implement the entire six-phase timelines of the AU continental integration agenda 
(CIA) simultaneously prior to the full implementation of the RCEP agreement. To 
access and monitor the progress in implementing the six-phase timelines, the region 
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Appendix 1: Intra-trade and extra-trade of country groups by product, annual (US$ million) 
YEAR  2015    2016    2017    2018   
PARTNER* ROR ROW TTG IG ROR ROW TTG IG ROR ROW TTG IG ROR ROW TTG IG 
ECONOMY**                 
World 0.0 0.0 18981.2 16546.3 0.0 0.0 16546.3 15993.3 0.0 0.0 15993.3 17687.8 0.0 0.0 17687.8 19414.0 
AMU 2.9 118.8 123.9 3.4 3.1 80.6 84.1 3.1 3.0 74.2 77.3 2.9 3.6 92.2 95.1 3.5 
APEC  0.0 2861.3 9113.1 5758.0 0.0 2565.4 8323.4 5566.1 0.0 2420.0 7986.1 6127.7 0.0 2685.9 8813.5 6690.4 
APTA 1352.2 2908.5 3282.7 364.0 1252.5 2751.1 3115.1 341.1 1156.2 2566.2 2907.3 390.4 1239.5 2798.9 3189.3 435.8 
ASEAN  557.8 970.0 1296.6 281.7 502.6 888.3 1170.0 269.3 490.2 880.1 1149.3 305.0 581.0 1010.5 1315.5 341.0 
ASEAN*** 1124.2 3187.5 4902.2 1567.4 1049.5 3027.7 4595.1 1508.1 973.8 2879.2 4387.3 1725.5 1030.8 3125.1 4850.6 1892.5 
CEMAC  1.3 39.2 40.3 0.8 1.0 22.3 23.1 0.7 0.8 18.2 18.8 0.9 1.0 21.0 21.9 0.8 
CEN-SAD  15.6 226.9 243.7 13.4 8.4 148.0 161.4 12.5 7.2 133.2 145.7 13.3 7.4 164.8 178.1 15.2 
COMESA  8.4 102.0 113.0 9.6 7.7 77.9 87.5 8.7 7.6 78.7 87.4 10.8 7.7 93.7 104.5 12.4 
EAC  2.5 10.7 13.6 3.1 2.3 10.6 13.7 2.7 2.3 11.0 13.7 2.6 2.7 11.4 14.0 2.9 
ECCAS  4.9 106.1 107.7 1.3 3.3 61.5 62.8 1.0 2.0 51.6 52.6 1.3 4.0 64.2 65.5 1.4 
ECOWAS  12.7 134.2 145.9 8.7 5.7 77.1 85.8 7.3 4.4 62.4 69.6 8.3 4.7 82.1 90.4 9.1 
EFTA  268.4 458.2 460.8 2.0 217.4 399.5 401.5 2.0 224.5 396.8 398.8 1.9 225.2 404.3 406.2 2.2 
IGAD  2.1 14.8 17.2 2.5 2.0 12.9 15.4 2.4 2.4 12.8 15.2 2.7 2.0 14.3 17.0 2.5 
MERCOSUR  100.2 335.3 386.4 40.1 74.5 260.7 300.9 37.3 69.0 247.8 285.0 41.2 79.8 283.7 324.9 42.9 
SADC  5.1 165.1 204.6 34.4 4.8 122.5 156.9 30.3 3.9 114.6 144.9 33.7 4.9 137.9 171.6 37.0 
WAEMU  5.6 22.6 26.5 3.2 3.4 20.2 23.4 3.0 3.0 19.6 22.6 3.4 3.1 22.5 25.9 3.4 
Compiled by authors. Source: UNCTADstat (2020). *Rest of the region (ROR); Rest of the world (ROW); Total trade of group (TTG); Intra-group (IG) 
 **AMU (Arab Maghreb Union); APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation); APTA (Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement); ***ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations); ASEAN (Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations) plus China, Japan and Republic of Korea; CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa); CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States); COMESA (Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa); EAC (East African Community);  ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States); ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States);  EFTA (European Free 









Appendix 2. Exports by product group, origin and destination, 2018 (US$ million) 
           Destination 
                                    Developing economies   






World 1 206 418 652 441 23 809 24 990 603 642 14 655 532 837 
 (100) (54) (2) (2) (50) (1) (44) 
Developing economies 557 799 367 943 15 797 11 277 340 870 2 702 181 245 
 (100) (66) (3) (2) (61) (0) (32) 
Developing economies: Africa 93 252 53 592 9 188 713 43 690 459 33 795 
 (100) (57) (10) (1) (47) (0) (36) 
Developing economies: 
America 136 284 77 387 1 083 7 133 69 172 650 58 036 
 (100) (57) (1) (5) (51) (0) (43) 
Developing economies: Asia 
and Oceania 328 263 236 965 5 526 3 431 228 008 1 593 89 414 
 (100) (72) (2) (1) (69) (0) (27) 
Transition economies 54 967 16 047 652 260 15 135 7 190 31 730 
 (100) (29) (1) (0) (28) (13) (58) 
Developed economies 593 652 268 451 7 360 13 453 247 637 4 763 319 862 
 (100) (45) (1) (2) (42) (1) (54) 




Appendix 3. Merchandise: Total trade and share by some regional trading blocs (annual, US$ billion) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
AMU  142.0 134.8 174.0 152.7 123.5 83.9 77.1 94.8 112.7 106.7 
APEC  7245.3 8511.5 8756.0 8937.8 9121.2 8326.0 7982.9 8811.7 9587.6 9407.7 
APTA  2302.9 2798.2 2934.6 3129.3 3288.2 3119.4 2912.0 3194.6 3479.8 3428.8 
ASEAN  3864.0 4516.2 4648.8 4753.2 4902.4 4592.2 4383.2 4851.4 5277.5 5168.0 
CACM  31.9 38.2 39.8 39.6 40.6 38.7 39.0 41.3 41.5 44.4 
CEMAC  35.7 44.6 44.5 41.9 39.4 26.5 22.8 23.8 28.2 26.7 
CEN-SAD  240.2 261.4 295.0 257.4 244.6 161.7 147.0 177.4 209.9 212.6 
CIS  529.6 702.3 712.4 694.7 658.9 445.9 370.3 464.2 577.5 553.5 
COMESA  135.4 117.2 152.1 139.3 113.3 86.6 87.3 104.4 118.8 112.4 
SADC  181.0 223.0 218.8 215.7 205.9 157.4 146.8 172.2 189.8 172.0 
TPP  2438.1 2808.3 2807.6 2747.1 2769.6 2454.0 2434.7 2724.1 2971.6 2941.8 
UNASUR  81.8 112.7 121.4 113.3 99.4 56.5 43.7 51.2 54.4 36.8 
WAEMU 20.7 24.0 23.8 24.6 26.4 23.3 23.0 25.4 27.1 28.7 
ECCAS  92.0 119.1 122.7 117.2 107.3 66.3 56.6 67.3 81.1 69.4 
ECO  344.6 441.0 435.8 416.7 426.6 328.2 311.3 364.2 411.4 366.7 
ECOWAS 114.8 155.1 155.7 133.5 147.0 86.5 70.9 89.4 107.8 110.5 
EFTA 330.9 400.6 478.5 518.9 460.9 398.4 395.7 405.5 438.1 421.8 
*Compiled by authors. Source: UNCTADstat (2020). * ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization); CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States); CACM (Central American Common Market); TPP (Trans-Pacific 









© 2021 by the authors. Licensee JPPD, Indonesia. This article is an open-access 
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons 
Attribution (CC BY) license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
